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1. Definition and Justification of the Problem 
 
The dissertation examines whether the deficiencies of the international aid regime – 
especially the lower than desired level of aid – can be explained by the author’s hypothesis 
stating that international aid can be seen as a global public good.  
International aid has become a relevant element of the international regime and an 
important manifestation of inter-state relations since World War II. International aid means 
that one actor (the donor) voluntarily transfers resources to another actor (the recipient) (at 
least partially) with the aim of supporting the development and welfare of the latter one. 
During the half-century-long history of aid, significant sums have been transferred to 
developing countries. In the 1990s there was a temporary setback, but since the millennium 
the volume of aid has grown and international aid as a policy has received more attention than 
before. In this context, security aspects of aid have become more important and thus the 
system of motivations of the aid regime has been transformed. The change in donor 
motivations makes it necessary to use an alternative approach to investigate aid. The 
dissertation uses a concept from microeconomics, namely the concept of public goods and the 
factors affecting its demand and supply to describe aid. Public goods are non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous goods. (Stiglitz 2000: 143) This leads to the supply of public goods being 
insufficient in a free market model and to the consumers being bound to free-riding. The 
dissertation explains some shortcomings of the aid regime with this model.  
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2. Methodology 
 
The phenomenon of international aid is mostly investigated through a political or 
international political economics approach. The dissertation opens up another approach in 
order to identify some shortcomings of the international aid regime and investigate if there are 
means or actors that can eliminate those deficiencies. 
Using this analytical framework we examine whether the distinction of private goods 
and public goods can be used for international aid. In order to have an accurate picture about 
the problems of aid, the dissertation first summarizes the literature of international aid, 
describes its general characteristics, defines the concept of international aid and its role in 
development. After that it summarizes the history of aid and the trends affecting it. We 
introduce the forms and actors of aid and then summarize the findings in the literature about 
the effectiveness of aid, especially in fragile states. We analyse the question most relevant to 
the subject of the dissertation, namely aid as a political instrument and its motivations. We 
approach the benefits of donors gained through aid by their motivations.  
Those issues lead to one of the main questions of the thesis: can aid really be viewed 
as a global public good? After clarifying the concepts of public and private goods we extend 
the analytical framework to the global public goods and distinguish between two groups of 
consumers: the donors and the recipients. We examine the nature of aid for these two groups 
and the implications of our findings for the aid regime.  
Our model will be examined through a case study of aid in Afghanistan. This country 
is suitable to test the hypothesis since state building has primarily security motivations for the 
donors and the stability of Afghanistan is of interest to global security.  
Afghanistan has received a significant amount of aid over the last decade. For 
understanding this, one needs to be aware of the political and military context. Through 
drafting the problems of the country, we make it possible that our hypothesis can be 
confirmed. In the light of this we can analyse the phenomena and motivations of aid in 
Afghanistan, the impacts of aid on the security situation and its role in state-building and 
peace-building. We investigate the role of aid in Afghanistan’s modern history and the 
contribution of aid to the creation of security. At the end of the chapter, security in 
Afghanistan can be conceptualized as a global public good and aid as a necessary means to 
reach security can also be viewed as a global public good. 
The main hypothesis of the dissertation – saying that aid is a global public good – 
explains why the amount of aid is lower than the level deemed necessary by all actors, even 
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the donors. The second main hypothesis of the dissertation inquires if there are actors who can 
eliminate this deficiency at a global level. Since there is no global governance which could 
supply the desired amount of global public goods, the question arises whether a civil society 
is able to do this. At a sub-state level NGOs can raise the supply of public goods significantly 
through the voluntary contribution of citizens.  
The questions is if non-governmental development organizations (NGDOs) are able to 
increase the volume (or the quality) of aid as a global public good. In order to analyse this 
question we need to go back to non-profit literature, since a part of it explains the formation 
of NGOs with the need to complement the insufficient supply of public goods. We examine 
the role of NGOs in international relations and specifically in international aid, and we try to 
find out how they can become capable of supplying aid as a global public good or increasing 
its quality and quantity. As a part of the Afghanistan case study we analyse the role of NGOs 
in the country. Finally, synthesizing the recognitions of the thesis, we examine to what extent 
international NGOs can help to solve the problems arising from the public-goods-nature of 
aid. Are NGOs able to provide aid as a public good? As a specific example we analyse aid in 
the healthcare sector, describe aid provided by Hungary as a donor and the experiences of the 
Hungarian Baptist Aid, one of the Hungarian NGDOs in Afghanistan that specialises in 
healthcare sector aid.  
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3. Key Findings 
 
3.1. The public-goods-nature of aid 
The thesis uses an approach where aid has two groups of consumers: the recipients and 
the donors who consume the “results” achieved by the aid they provide and pay for this 
through the material resources they spend on aid. Aid behaves in a completely different way 
for the two groups of consumers. It is easy to see that aid is private goods for the recipients. 
The given recipient group, which can either be an individual person, a village or a whole 
country, competes with other potential recipients. Potential consumers can also be excluded, 
even if we take the potential positive externalities into account. 
For the donors, and in a broader sense the whole international community, aid can be 
public goods since its aim is per definition to support the economic and social development 
and welfare of a country. The thesis analyses the three groups of motivations for giving aid 
according to the public-goods-nature of aid. These three groups of motivations are the 
following: economic and commercial goals, foreign policy and security policy goals and 
moral, ideological motivations.  
The picture is mixed in the case of economic goals. The donor can use aid as a tool to 
gain position, to increase exports and this does not benefit other countries. To a smaller 
extent, they can benefit from the gaining positions of the donor indirectly since if the donor’s 
income increases, it will also increase its imports according to its income elasticity and this 
will be an advantage for other countries. (Szentes [2005] p. 304). If the economic 
performance of the recipient country improves, this can also benefit other countries, for 
example through the expansion of markets (there are no rivalry and excludability). Avoiding 
bankruptcy, sustaining the ability to repay loans can also be global public goods.  
Security policy interests, both ”hard” and “soft” security, make aid even more of a 
global public good. An important goal of aid is to maintain or establish the political and 
military stability of a region. This benefits the countries of the region much more than remote 
countries. The declared goal of aid is to fight some global problems, like environmental 
degradation, uncontrolled migration, the spread of certain epidemics, organized crime and 
terrorism. (Jayaraman – Kanbur [1999], Kanbur [2001]). The mitigation of these problems is 
a common interest of all countries and no-one can be excluded from this.  
Contrary to the security interests, foreign policy goals of aid are rather private goods, 
since other countries can be excluded from these. It is the donor who benefits from gaining 
political influence in the partner country and it is them that can gain an ally for their strategic 
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interests (for example gaining supporting votes in international organizations). The donor can 
also support preferred ethnic, religious or other social groups or political movements in the 
recipient country. (Smillie – Minear 2003: 6). Another benefit, even though less significant, is 
the benefit of increase in prestige in the eyes of the international donor community. The 
international aid regime has its own norms striving to reach a higher level of aid (Millennium 
Development Goals, the 0.7% target of ODA/GDP, the EU’s own targets) and there are 
statistics and reports investigating the quality of aid (commissioned by the OECD DAC, the 
UNDP and civil initiatives). These norms make it possible that a donor who provides aid of 
good quality and significant quantity can benefit from the prestige arising from this. This 
resembles the term ”demonstration effect” from microeconomics. Demonstration effect means 
that some people consume something, it makes another consumer buy the good. Aid donors 
can also have an intention to imitate others.  
In the case of moral and ideological goals, the results are the least unequivocal. The 
realist theory suggests that a donor only supplies aid if this will serve their own interests. This 
can be either economic or political interest, but also the spreading of ideological interests. 
This is not a public good, at most it can be the club good of a certain group. According to the 
liberal school of aid literature, aid without selfish interest which is motivated by humanitarian 
or solidarity considerations must exist (Lumsdaine 1993). This is justified by the fact that the 
population of donor countries giving large amounts of aid supports aid with humanitarian 
considerations most. (Smillie – Minear 2003: 12). This is especially true for emergency aid. 
The achievement of humanitarian goals, the reduction of poverty and human suffering can be 
regarded as a global public good since this is of common value for all – at least if we share the 
liberal approach. 
This means that aid has several benefits from which the countries who are not 
providing aid can not be excluded and there is no rivalry in consumption. This has even been 
more relevant since security motivations came into view. Earlier, particular economic 
interests and the Cold War logic were more dominant and all this resulted in more private 
good type benefits. The securitization of aid shifted it even more towards being global public 
goods. From the benefits of the stability of the international regime, no-one can be excluded. 
The lack of rivalry is also proved by the fact that donors do not compete to increase their aid 
volume. 
Public goods can be divided in two groups: final global public goods and intermediate 
global public goods. (Kaul et al 1999: 13) Goals like international peace, security and the 
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equitable allocation of goods are final global public goods. International aid can be a tool to 
reach this and thus, it is a form of an intermediate global public good.  
Aid being a private good for recipients and a public good for donors has several 
implications. For the recipients this means that demand will adjust to price zero. Still, demand 
will not be infinite for several reasons: aid does not only consist of grants, but of preferential 
loans; aid is allocated in many cases on certain conditions; and aid poses a significant 
administrative burden on the recipients. Yet, we can see that the demand for aid is much 
bigger than its supply. 
Another problem is that the consumers (the recipients) do not pay the price of aid, so 
they do not express their exact preferences. They do not show their reservation price, i.e. the 
highest price a buyer is willing to pay for a certain product. Thus, no market mechanisms, but 
political–bureaucratic decisions allocate aid. This concerns the allocation among states, but 
also among sub-state target groups, regions, communities and households.  
The distorting effect of aid being a free of charge good is exactly, that recipients will 
not consume it through purchasing, but through persuading the donor to support him. The 
recipient can appeal to the interest of donors or make political and economic deals to acquire 
aid. Demonstrating being in need is also a method for appealing for aid. This way it is not 
efficiency but the interests of donors, the deals of the actors and the bargaining power of the 
recipient which determine allocation.  
Aid being a public good for donors also has important implications, since the problems 
of public goods show clearly in their case. Mainstream economics describes free riding and 
sub-optimal supply as a market failure. For global public goods sub-optimal supply is even 
more of a serious problem. Since groups of consumers are numerous and complex, 
coordination problems are very significant. At a national level, the state can substitute the 
market and produce public goods, but at international levels there is no possibility like that 
because there is no global government. International regimes (financial, commercial, aid 
regimes, etc.) are trying to fill this gap. The international aid regime strives to improve 
coordination and eliminate the disadvantages of sub-optimal supply. The Millennium 
Development Goals, the various ODA/GDP targets, the peer reviews of the OECD DAC all 
serve this goal.  
The public-good-nature of aid also implies that the supply is not coordinated by 
market mechanisms like in the case of private goods. Since the international development 
regime is explicitly decentralized and the number of actors is large, the political–bureaucratic 
coordination mechanisms are not sufficient. Lack of coordination is described by several 
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authors as an obstacle to efficiency (e.g. van de Walle 2001, Smillie – Minear 2003). There 
are intentions to strengthen political–bureaucratic coordination in order to reduce the 
decentralization of the system. Actually, this is what OECD DAC and, in the field of 
humanitarian aid, the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative strive for. Other concepts 
would enhance market coordination through further decentralization and the introduction of 
more market mechanisms. (Easterly 2002). 
The public-good-nature of aid has become of great significance since the security 
motivations of donors came into view. In parallel, the amount of aid has risen (see chapter 
1.3.2. of the dissertation). There are three ways to explain this. Either, the donors recognized 
aid as being a public good and voluntarily reduced their free-riding. This would contradict our 
previous experience and the theory of public goods. Or, the individual benefit, which can be 
internalized by the donors, has grown, and this has made them increase their supply. Or, the 
alternative mechanisms which strived to decrease free-riding were succesful. The growth in 
the volume of multilateral aid can be an example for the latter one. If aid is given based on 
multilateral interests, not bilateral ones, a kind of international supplying authority can come 
into being. This resembles the state providing public goods instead of the market at domestic 
levels. 
To sum up, aid has two different faces for recipients and donors: for the former it is 
private goods, for the latter it approaches the concept of global public goods. The problems of 
public goods, sub-optimal supply and free-riding, are intensified by the unrealistically high 
demand for aid due to the preferential conditions of allocating them. 
 
3.2. The contribution of NGOs to the supply of aid as a global public goods 
The rise of NGOs can be observed not only generally at the international level, but 
specifically in the field of aid. The aid regime is a product of the post-World War II period 
and civil society organizations were embedded quite early in this regime. Humanitarian and 
development NGOs work in implementation and fundraising. They play an important role in 
the mobilization of the public and thus political advocacy also became a part of their 
activities.  
There are two factors which explicitly helped the rise of NGDOs (non-governmental 
development organizations) First, they filled a market niche: the big donor countries were 
tired of supporting recipient governments of questionable efficiency, they did not want to 
expand the operative capacities of the UN family and they neither wanted to increase their 
own apparatus, so they found the implementers of aid projects in the NGOs. Actually, this 
means that they found a supplier of public goods outside the state. The other reason is the 
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intention to involve local target groups. Since NGOs mostly have a close relationship with 
local organizations and the target groups themselves, they can be useful in achieving this goal. 
In the 1970s there was a change of orientation in the aid regime: basic necessities came into 
view instead of big infrastructural investments. This meant that peripheral groups were 
targeted with small-scale projects. The aid agencies of donor countries did not have the 
capacity to work in a decentralized manner, or cooperate with the recipients in several small 
projects in remote areas. NGOs were a solution to this problem. Later, there was another shift 
towards NGOs: the conservative turn in the Thatcher and Reagan era did not only imply the 
shift of social services towards the private sector domestically, but internationally too. 
(Ahmed – Potter 2006) 
There were two significant increases in the finance of NGDOs in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The reason for this on the one hand is that they had a close relationship with the local society 
and thus could increase the effectiveness of aid. On the other hand, it is their ability to 
strengthen local civil society and thus their contribution to the spread of democratic norms. 
The amount of NGO aid (coming from both private and public sources) grew from one billion 
USD in 1970 to seven billion in 1990. (Ahmed – Potter 2006: 104) 
We can draw a parallel between the global engagement of NGOs and their domestic 
role. In general, we may suppose that a state provides aid in the quantity desired by its 
citizens. Public choice theory states that a democratic political community will supply public 
goods in a quantity fitting the preferences of the median voter. (Stiglitz 2000). The result of 
this is that if someone desires a higher amount of public goods than the median voter, he will 
try to find alternative methods to increase the supply. Generally, this is the reason for the 
creation of NGOs. (Weisbrod 1977) 
As far as aid is concerned, this means that individuals who are not satisfied with the 
aid granted by their countries will finance aid through additional resources, i.e. donations. 
These donations will mostly be channelled through NGOs to the recipients. NGDOs come 
into being because the volume of aid provided by institutional donors is insufficient and a part 
of the population expects a higher level of aid (more public goods). They can buy a higher 
amount of aid through their donations given to NGOs. In the framework of the model, this 
reduces the problems arising from sub-optimal supply.  
 There are three ways NGOs can contribute to international aid: fundraising, advocacy 
and improving the quality of aid through the comparative advantages of NGOs. 
Practically all NGOs work on fundraising since the collection of donations is a central 
question to most of them. If we regard aid as a public good, we can see that through raising 
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the funds for their activities, NGOs contribute to the increase of the global public good 
represented by aid. The motivation of private donors can be the feeling of doing something 
good, the joy of helping others. Many people feel that it is their duty to help people in need. If 
NGOs collect and channel these funds to the recipients, they increase the supply of aid as a 
public good.  
The Hudson Institute Center for Global Prosperity (CGP) attempts to size up private 
donations from the big donor countries. According to the research conducted by CGP, the 
amount of private donations was 56 billion USD in 2011. This is more than a third of the 
official development assistance. (Hudson Institute 2012: 8-13) Although the overall amount 
of private donations shows an increasing tendency, the ratio of official grants in the turnover 
of NGOs is also growing. This means on the one hand that NGOs have become more 
important for official donors than aid implementers. On the other hand, it is a sign of the 
limits NGOs face when they try to raise funds from the private sector. Private donors are only 
willing to pay in a higher level of aid to a limited extent and humanitarian emergencies often 
induce them to do so.  
We do not have unequivocal data about the amount of private donations going to 
NGOs, but we can suppose that it is a large part. So, it can be said that the fundraising 
activities of NGOs are relevant. This means that they can increase the amount of public goods 
and thus decrease the problems arising from the sub-optimal supply. 
Another significant role of NGOs is advocacy and keeping certain crises and issues on 
the agenda. In our analytical framework this means that NGOs attempt to reduce free riding of 
donors, they try to make donors provide more and better aid. Only few NGOs are influential 
enough to be efficient in advocacy independently. The NGO platforms introduced in the 
dissertation in short do not only play a role in coordination, but also in advocacy. Besides 
local platforms, the international networks also play a key role in representing the interests 
they experience in the field towards their own governments.  
Summarizing the advocacy role of NGOs, we can see that NGOs have reached good 
results in improving the quality of aid, but not in the reduction of free-riding. At global levels, 
there are examples of issues and forgotten crises put on the agenda by NGOs.  
Besides fundraising and advocacy, there are other characteristics of NGO activities 
that have a positive impact on the amount and the quality of aid. The question arises if NGO 
aid is more efficient than official aid. 
In the case of complex humanitarian emergencies, like the Afghan crisis, NGOs have 
several responsibilities. They are primarily implementers but they also act as a source of 
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information (because they often arrive earlier and stay longer in the field than other 
international actors). They also participate in peace building. Building a peaceful society 
requires, besides mere peacekeeping, activities which armed forces are not able to perform. 
These are, for instance, the supervision of elections, the resolution of conflicts, mediation, 
strengthening the civil society and the support of civil initiatives. Since NGOs are more 
neutral, they are suitable for this job. (Ahmed – Potter 2006: 170-173) 
There are some other advantages of NGO aid. Civil solidarity has historic traditions. 
Through micro-level aid implemented by NGOs, the project can have a direct connection with 
target groups, thus aid can be more targeted and more efficient. A direct relationship with 
target groups means that the NGO can conduct a more reliable needs assessment and the final 
beneficiaries can participate in the planning, implementation and evaluation phases of the 
project. 
NGO aid contributes to the strengthening of the local civil society because they work 
in partnership with local NGOs or community-based organizations. Strengthening civil 
society and capacity building of NGOs are often a direct objective of NGO projects. 
Especially smaller NGOs can work with operational mechanisms which are less 
bureaucratic. Bigger organizations require more formal elements in operational mechanisms 
but even so, they are often more flexible than state agencies. As a result of flexibility, they are 
able to react fast, which is one of the reasons why NGOs are the first to appear in 
humanitarian emergencies.  
An NGO has the possibility, much more than a donor country, to specialize in a 
geographic region, a sector, or a type of target groups. There are NGOs working only in 
Afghanistan, or others focusing on healthcare sector aid, or a specific target group like 
children. Official donors also specialize; Hungary for example designated its international 
development cooperation partner countries. An NGO which is less bound by political 
considerations can afford being much more specialized. A higher level of specialization can 
lead to more field experience and more professionalism, and this can contribute to an increase 
in aid effectiveness.  
NGOs can also afford to work in countries that are not supported by official donors for 
political reasons. This was also shown in Afghanistan, since during the rule of the Taliban the 
international community chose the policy of isolation, but still, some NGOs continued to 
work in the country. 
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In as far as an NGO can realize the advantages coming from its organizational 
structure, it can enhance the quality of international aid and thus increase the supply of aid as 
a global public good. 
 
3.3. Testing the model in Afghanistan 
There are three reasons why Afghanistan is a good example for analysing the public-
good-nature of aid: first, there has been an armed conflict in the country for several decades, 
second, the negative externalities of the conflict (the connection with al-Quaeda) make 
security in Afghanistan a global public good and third, because the country receives a large 
amount of aid.  
The public-good-nature is especially relevant, because state building and peace 
building, the primary goals of aid, are also global public goods. It is the crucial interest of 
donors that Afghanistan shall not pose a security threat to other countries, neither through 
sinking into anarchy, nor through radical groups building a strong central power. This could 
only be guaranteed through moderate and stable state structures.  
After 2001, the donor community turned its interests rapidly to Afghanistan and the 
country received much more aid than other significant humanitarian emergencies. This proves 
that it was a priority for donors to participate in the rebuilding of Afghanistan. Through our 
public goods perspective, we can explain this in the following way. The countries of the 
military coalitions already reached one kind of global public goods through the ousting of the 
Taliban and the terrorist groups connected to them. Presumably, they decreased the chance of 
terrorist attacks worldwide and thus contributed to global security. Still, they did not want to 
pay the price of this public good alone. For decreasing free riding of others, they pressed other 
countries to contribute either militarily or through aid to the efforts in Afghanistan. Presently, 
48 countries are involved in the peacemaking operations and the significant volume of aid 
proves that the Afghan crisis is different from other humanitarian crises.  
The dilemma of the United States and the countries contributing to the ISAF face the 
dilemma now about the future of Afghanistan: is it possible to prepare a pullout in a way that 
the insurgents do not take over? We can find an explanation for this dilemma if we resort to 
the public-goods theory. Political developments have shown that the price of a stable and 
moderate Afghanistan as a global public good is higher than expected: despite military, 
political and financial efforts the new Afghan state is not strong enough to function without 
external support and a final military victory does not seem to be possible. Washington’s 
dilemma is that if they withdraw, they risk losing the public goods reached by the foreign 
support and control of present-day Afghanistan, i.e. the relative repelling of terrorist groups. 
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But if they maintain the present state, they will have to finance the military presence and the 
Afghan state for an unpredictable length of time.  
Most big donor countries contribute to the costs in the field of aid, so free riding is not 
a smaller problem in aid efforts than in military efforts. Taking care of armed forces has a 
much higher political price (primarily towards domestic constituencies), so states are more 
inclined to free riding. The concept of free riding can explain the discourse which has arisen 
in most countries participating in the military intervention. A direct cost-benefit analysis does 
not justify for countries such as Hungary to send troops to Afghanistan, but NATO 
membership is a policy priority for the country so the countries having more interest in the 
Afghanistan operation, especially the United States, can persuade their smaller allies to 
contribute to the intervention. 
Of course, not all problems of the country are due to the deficiencies resulting from 
the public-good nature of aid. The security situation, the fragmentation of the society and 
illicit opium production all endanger the stability and development of the country. However, 
the dissertation uses a public-good approach because this perspective can be used to analyse 
other crises and securitized aid issues. The problems arising from the public-good nature of 
aid are not country-specific to Afghanistan, but they are especially relevant there.  
One quarter of all aid going to Afghanistan is channelled through NGOs (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2005: 13; Waisová 2008: 79) and their fields of activity are 
manifold. Their role in Afghanistan is of interest in the dissertation, because the Afghan 
experience and the activities of Hungarian Baptist Aid, the chosen case study, support the 
statements made above and provide some additional information. 
Like in other regions, NGOs can contribute to the supply of aid as a public good 
through fundraising. After 2001 it was easy to raise funds from the private sector since 
Afghanistan received a lot of media attention. Several NGOs organized campaigns for this 
issue. But the crisis is prolonged and there is a need of long-term engagement. Preserving the 
attention of private donors is very difficult, so it is hard to raise private donations a decade 
after the fall of the Taliban. This is justified by the experiences of HBAid. They implemented 
only a smaller part of their Afghan projects from private donations, moreover, these donations 
were unlabelled donations not dedicated to Afghanistan but to any activity of the NGO. The 
majority of the projects were financed by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Advocacy is another important task of NGOs. In Afghanistan, this did not mean 
keeping the crisis on the political agenda because the country received media attention 
anyway. Lobbying for adequate aid policies and good quality aid was an important issue, so 
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the success of NGOs can be measured in this field. However, the advocacy role of NGOs in a 
complex emergency like in Afghanistan can be questioned since there are serious security 
concerns on the agenda. These belong to the traditional foreign policy, and states are anxious 
about keeping their privileges in this field. 
While the world did not pay too much attention to Afghanistan, that is primarily in the 
1990s, NGOs played an important role in keeping the problems of the country on the agenda 
and raising awareness about the oppressive nature of the Taliban. In this period, NGO 
advocacy was very important. Still, it was not the humanitarian situation but the terrorist 
attacks against the Twin Towers which accelarated the decision about intervention. Similarly, 
after 2001, it was not the NGOs, but the countries sharing the most of the burdens of the 
intervention that were pressing other donors to avoid free riding. The role of NGOs is rather 
important in the case of forgotten crises. 
The example of Hungarian Baptist Aid shows that an NGO can play an essential role 
in certain aid issues especially towards its own donors, but NGOs do not have much saying in 
the strategic decisions of global actors.  
Besides that, Afghanistan is also a good example to show that NGO aid can have 
advantages over official aid and this can mean an increase in quality. Some typical advantages 
of NGO aid are manifested in the projects of HBAid. In the case of the humanitarian aid 
projects this was the fast and flexible reaction and the needs-based approach of HBAid based 
on its previous experience. Later, in the case of the development projects, the advantages of 
NGO aid were in close relationship with target groups and the participation of the 
beneficiaries in the needs assessment and the design of projects. Partnership with local NGOs 
had a beneficial effect on the capacity of partners. These factors show that NGOs can improve 
the quality of aid as a public good in Afghanistan. 
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4. Conclusions 
Summarizing the conclusions of the dissertation, the hypothesis stating that 
international aid can be regarded as a public good seems to be verified. Aid appears as public 
goods for donors in several instances, and this model gives a good explanation for some 
deficiencies of the aid regime. The insufficient amount of resources can be deducted from the 
sub-optimal supply of public goods and the free-riding of consumers. 
These problems are alleviated by the civil sector trying to fill these gaps at 
international levels. NGDOs play an important role in fundraising, advocacy against free-
riding and through the potentially higher quality of aid. Despite this, they are not able to fill 
all the gaps of the regime. NGOs are not sufficient alone to produce public goods, even at 
domestic levels there is the need for the state to play a role. Similarly, at international levels 
we can see that there are no global actors who could mitigate the shortage of public goods, 
since there is no global governance. 
Further research could elaborate on the applicability of the model in the following 
fields without claiming completeness: 
- To what extent does the model explain the existence and the characteristics of 
multilateral aid? 
- To what extent is it possible to eliminate the deficiencies of the aid regime through 
the lenses of regime theory and the theory about global governance? 
- How much does the role of NGOs differ in producing aid as a public good in other 
types of crises, for example forgotten crises? 
- How can we use the theory of public goods in other fields of international politics 
and in other international regimes? 
 
Finally, the supply of aid as a public good can be increased if its benefits are more and 
more internalized by the donors. If in the future the goals of aid shift even more towards 
security policy considerations, the donors can have more benefits from aid and its stabilizing 
effect. This can make them less bound to free-riding and more willing to increase their own 
supply.  
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